The idea of family in the western culture has evolved throughout the centuries, from a strong-tied relationship between man-woman-children to the most varied combinations of person-to-person bonds. In many Western societies, the parents' sexual orientation no longer defines the family structure. This paper studies identity and family relations by means of semiotics and conceptual metaphor theory. Keywords intersubjective relations, blend, selfhood, static and dynamic spatial metaphors, social identity development.
Introduction
, described identity as follows:
[…] a subjective sense, as well as an observable quality of personal sameness and continuity, pared with some belief in the sameness and continuity of some shared world image […] a unique unification of what is irreversibly given -that is, body type and temperament, giftedness and vulnerability, infantile models and acquired ideals-with the open choices provided in available roles, occupational possibilities, values offered, mentors met, friendships made, and first sexual encounters. (Erikson, n.p.) In Erikson's view, identity involves physical and psychological constraints, "body type, temperament, giftedness and vulnerability" alongside "acquired ideals with the open choices provided in available roles." That is, it develops by means of a series of experiences across the differ-ent stages of a person's life that orient his (or her; female identity is not even mentioned) conduct towards change and adaptation. Paradoxically, these 'changes' cause personality to emerge as "a unique unification of what is irreversibly given." The problems implicit in the term identity, which denotes a process rather than a defining quality, are present in the above definition; how is it possible to encapsulate change into language, whose role is to fix meaning into words so as to communicate things in the clearest possible way? How are abstracts terms, such as identity, explained in a language that situates all its units in a fixed space and time, that of textual moments (on this see Traugott, 1978; Bierwisch, 1996; López-Varela, "Spatiotemporal Topographies," 2010) ? If concepts, such as identity, can be absolutely fixed, does this mean that they are the same for all cultures?
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), which developed from Johnson and Lakoff ground breaking book, Metaphors We Live By (1980) holds that metaphor is a cognitive mechanism used to express abstract concepts in terms of concrete phenomenological ones, and that this conceptualizations can be seen at work in ordinary discourse. The model relies on experientialism and presents higher levels of cognition as dependent on abstraction. Metaphor is defined as a mapping of conceptual structures from one domain of experience onto another. According to Lakoff, basic-level or 'image-schemas' arise "as a result of our capacities for gestalt perception, mental imagery, and motor movement" (Lakoff, 1987: 302) . The most basic ones are spatial mappings such as source-path-goal, centre-periphery, and container, based on human physical perceptions of the world (top-bottom gravity vector; the Self as perceiving centre, separated by skin boundary but simultaneous reaching out by means of extremities -arms/legs -and their extensions -tools). In domains where there is no clearly discernible pre-conceptual structure to experience, this is imported via metaphors grounded on phenomenological/natural kinds of experiences. For instance, time, love, ideas, understanding, happiness, health, morality, etc, are concepts that require metaphorical definitions because they cannot be explained directly by perceptual analogies (based on attributes from vision, scent, touch, hearing or taste).
Neuroscientific evidence would seem to confirm that interactions with the environment (i.e. artefact manipulation) and with our social groups (i.e. family-child relations) develop early motivations for metaphorical transfer. Later stages of semiotic development conceptualize the non-physical (abstract) in terms of the physical. However, the sociocultural factors involved in embodied metaphorization cannot be downplayed in favour of biological reductionism because research has also proven the situated nature of metaphor (Kimmel, 2002; Kövecses, 2005; Gibbs and Matlock, 2008) and its intersubjective dimensions (López-Varela, 2010) . This means that some cognitive metaphors are culture-free while others are culture-specific, since mappings from the source domain to the target domain, incorporate material changes (biophysical -new ways of perception; technological -new tools/technologies that alter perception) and cultural shifts (societal values, fashion, economic changes). These metaphorical changes can be seen at work in the concept of identity.
Identity, Intersubjectivity and Metaphoric Projections
Western reflections on identity have evolved from teocentric conceptions, where individuals were modelled on images of a divinity with an immutable essence, to the existential models where the Self became situated in time and space (Heidegger's dasein) and existence split between conscious and unconscious, and into roles assigned by society.
The reflexion on existence (ontos) and knowledge (logos) of the Self, of Others, and of the world around, has gradually given way to an interdisciplinary discourse (epistemos) on the nature of the signs by means of which human communicate with others and with the world. Selfhood is represented in the praxis of language and meaningful action, and negotiated with others in communicative situations were individuals take on different roles. Within the field of psychology, studies such as those by Lynne Jacobs (1992), Stolorow and Atwood (1992) and Nick Crossley (1996) have explored self-objects relations and their intersubjective exchanges.
Alexander Kranjec (2006) names three frames of reference in which space can be divided for the perceiving subject; the intrinsic frame, closely related to the object -a salient figure against a given background; the deitic frame, ego-centred and grounded on subjectivity and human spatial interpretation; and the extrinsic frame, fixed and independent. How-ever, studies on individualized cognition fail to provide clear explanations for task-oriented behaviour and motivation, where the sharing of attention between several individuals becomes determinant.
During the second half of the 20th century, a convergence between psychological, semiotic and neuro-scientific findings discloses the socially constructed nature of individual minds. Marc Howard Ross speaks of "Social Identity Development" when he analyses identity dynamics in ethnic conflicts (2001) and notices that people belonging to particular ethnic and cultural groups share targets of externatisation which reinforce a common view of a world and frequently struggle to make this identity different form that of others, emphasized by means symbolic and ritual behaviours binding individuals to certain groups. More recently, the concept of intersubjectivity is contemplated as ontologically foundational to both intrapersonal cognitive understanding and transpersonal experiential semiotic engagement with phenomena. Intersubjectivity represents a comprehensive emotional, intentional/motivational, reflective, and behavioural experience of the other. It emerges from shared emotions (attunement), joint attention and awareness, and congruent intentions. (see Ricoeur, 1992; Jacobs, 1992; Crossley, 1996; Duranti, 2010; López-Varela, 2010) .
A very interesting evolutionary semiotic explanation on the development of intersubjectivity comes from Jordan Zlatev (2008) who distinguishes five levels of 'body mimesis' in the early stages of human development. Acts such as neonatal mirroring (i.e. mutual gaze) are representational and gradually intentional ('proto-mimesis'). Action imitation, shared attention and mirror self-recognition conform the second stage ('dyadic-mimesis'). In terms of somatosensory development, these two stages involve cross-modal mappings between exteroception (i.e. perception of the environment) generally dominated by vision and sound until the infant is able to move and touch) interoception (sense receptors which are sensible to internal conditions of the body) and proprioception (i.e. through kinesthetic sense perception encoded in receptors which provide information regarding muscle tension). It is not clear if wielded objects, encoded as tools, become incorporated into the body schema (largely innate, in the sense of being present at birth), so that the end of the tool effectively becomes an extension of the effector wielding it.
Studies have disclosed the existence of tactile input to neurons in objectselective visual areas (mirroring).
Importantly Zlatev argues that the focus on shared attention in 'dyadic mimesis' comes a good deal towards the construction of a consensual reality because it depends on a multi-tasking ability to shift one's perspective across distinct axes -the common focal point, the other's attention to the same, and also on the other's attending to one's own attending. The third stage, 'triadic-mimesis' involves declarative pointing, iconic gestures and full joint attention. This means that human interactions require not only an understanding of the representational relation between one's bodily motion and the object, action or event it corresponds to, but the realization that such a representational relation can be used communicatively because it has a similar meaning for the receptor as for the sender. In other words, sign-representations are not just related to objects but to the actions and events that include both agent and observer/actor situated in the world in terms of the interpersonal relations. Peirce, as well as pragmatists such as Paul Grice, John Searle or Sperber and Wilson already established the basis for intersubjective cognition and a common underlying cooperative principle. In Zlatev's classification, 'post-mimesis' involves an understanding of others as proto-agents whose motor representations are understood in a task-oriented manner that enables their actions to be interpreted. This process is achieved through the development of empathy by means of artificial constructions of fictional worlds. The structure of human communication consists largely in the construction, management and maintenance of this common intersubjective ground. Similarly, for Lakoff and Johnson's conceptualization takes place "in terms of a multidimensional gestalt of properties where the dimensions are perceptual, motor activity, purposive, functional, etc," (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 119, 181, 121) so that human experiences emerge from "interactional experience which depends on a number of variables, participants in the event, parts, stages, causation, purpose." (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 167, 171 ; summary taken from López-Varela, 2011) This awareness opened the way to cultural interpretations of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, such as those developed in Blended Theory (Fauconnier, 1985; Fauconnier and Turner, 2008) , where the basic unit of cognitive organization is not the 'domain' but the 'mental space,' a partial and temporary representational structure which speakers construct when thinking or talking about a perceived, imagined, past, present, or future situation. Mental spaces have enabled a line of inquiry into the role of cultural and sociological bonds in metaphorical projections. Fauconnier and Turner spoke of several levels of cognition: a "Cross Space Mapping," which connects Input Space X, that is the perceptual (sound, text, images) and its projection or mapping, Input Space Y, that is cognitive elements (perceptive elements + ideas), to a "Generic Mental Space," which contains what X,Y Inputs have in common a socio-cultural perspective (common knowledge, cultural background, sociological environment, co-text, context), and The Blended Space XY, which connects the three spaces just mentioned (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 49) . Concepts like analogy and association and their opposites, difference and ambiguity, play vital roles in the configuration of the blended space and they are related to their psychological equivalents (association and displacement).
The above lines have briefly presented the evolution in concept of identity, contemplated nowadays as a subject-to-subject construction activated by means of communicative situations, shared attention, gestures and, more importantly, language. The following section will attend to similar changes in the concept of family. I shall argue that the family might be explained as a case of conceptual projection or blend.
Family Blends
The family environment is, without a doubt, the first and most important intersubjective situation encountered by an individual. The family is also a cultural concept under evolution. In different societies and at different historical times, family members take on various roles. For instance, the growing incorporation of middle-class women to the labour market in the 20th century has contributed to shifts in the sharing of tasks in the home, and more and more men participate in domestic duties, in taking care of children, and in the education of their offspring.
The traditional family was established on a reproductive basis, composed of male, female and their children. In older societies, a kind of extended family, still present in many non-Western cultures, included also grandparents, and sometimes unmarried uncles or aunts, all of whom took on different roles in the family community. Physical characteristics were determinant in role assigning. It was thought, for instance, that women were better suited to stay at home and take care of relatives because of their natural gentleness and emotional aspects of their character. Women in the working classes were not considered fit for certain jobs, such as the police or the army, where physical strength was required. Women were thought to be weaker, and emotional, and taking care of relatives, educating children and nursing ageing or sick people, were the tasks more suited to their biological being. A person physiognomy was also fundamental in ascribing a particular sexual orientation. Because the family was ruled by reproductive concerns, there was no question about having two parents with the same sexual inclination conforming a family, since they would not be able to give birth to a natural child. Mono-parental families were limited to cases where one of the partners had died, in which case the other parent would normally remarry as soon as possible. It was unthinkable to have a family composed by a single mother. In this cases, the situation was normally hidden, and the woman sheltered by relatives.
It is interesting to see some of the metaphors applied to the family realm. They can help reveal the changes suffered by the concept of family. These changes also apply in the case of the concept of identity. In both cases, the move seems to have been towards a kind of democratization of the concept of territorial space, as applied to all human spaces, psychological (identity -the self) and sociological (the family). The metaphors used for the case of self-identity and the family fall under the category of spatial metaphors. As Dedre Gentner and Jonathan Grudin explain in their research on "The Evolution of Mental Metaphors in Psychology: A 90-Year Retrospective" (1985) these metaphors are grounded on analogies that have to do with spatial distribution of objects and their inter-relations, for instance, in terms of their territorial limits, but also below their sensory surfaces. The most common metaphorical expression is based on the analogy of 'the container. ' Penelope Lively voices a critical view on the late 19th century and early 20th-century family in her Family Album (2009). The functional role of the family as a perfect engendering 'machine' is evident is container de-scriptions such as "the family unit." As with identity, the idea of 'unity' brings to the fore associated characteristics such as "unalterable essence," "sameness," "coherent mass," "set of people united," "the corner stone of society," (Lively, 2009: 177) as well as "coherent functioning" in a movement towards "progress" and "betterment," in Hegelian terms. The family is also a refuge from the outside world, a place where peace is to be found; within the religious realm the family is "haven on earth"; in the political sphere the family is "an institution." Negative connotations to family relations would make use of expressions such as "family crisis," "the family is breaking down," "declining," "its bonds weaken." All these metaphors convey the idea of family (and Self) as a container (i.e. "the post war family contained the seeds of its own transformation"), a static unit, upwards in its positive connotations of growth, and downwards in it negative decay (Lively, 2009: 187) . Any movement associated to these (essential) entities comes from within, turning dynamic by means of the use of the word "seed," that is, in its reproductive role.
The metaphors used to describe the concept of family derive from other cognitive structures "not stated explicitly as part of the blend." (Fauconnier, 1997: 170) They follow" fairly automatically, from the unstated understanding that the causal structure has been projected from the target, not from the source" (Fauconnier, 1997: 170) . Furthermore, "the mere presence of metaphorical language does not by itself tell us whether the space-time metaphor is a psychologically real conceptual mapping. For example, the temporal and spatial meanings could be presented as alternate meaning senses o even as separate homophonic lexical entries" (Gentner, 2001: 205) . Mappings, then, can fluctuate between space domains (basic for object organization) and other domains from real life situations where object relationships are not directly perceived but may result from intersubjective situations, that is, learning from someone else's experiences (on the role of narratological structures in cognitive development, see López-Varela, 2010) .
In Western societies, traditional family units are opening up to become multiple dimensional dynamic structures. The description of mono-parental families as "one parent home" or "main, primary core" defines the family as living centre, like that of the earth. If this core is inserted into a bigger structure made of the son's or daughter's grandpar-ents, the expression "secondary or dependent one parent core" is used. This shows how the "core" is not an independent centre, but a node in a supportive network of dynamic relations and actions (see DePaulo, and Milardo, 2011) . Same-sex couples have also redefined family law in European countries, such as Spain, or in the United States of America, where as Joan Biskupic (USA Today) reports, they have become a hot topic on TV shows and movies (see also Rauch, 2004) .Euphemisms are used to refer to contemporary family unions which are not founded upon the traditional religious marriage. Civil unions, civil partnerships, domestic partnerships, registered partnerships, un-registered partnerships, cohabitation are some of the terms used to describe new realities such as "Marriage of Likeness" or Same-sex Union (Boswell, 1995) .
Family Bonds
It can be observed how the concept of family has changed from a static territorial structure attached to the "household", to a more permeable network of intersubjective relations (DePaulo and Milardo, 2011) . The container-space family, based on the idea of sheltering abode, gives way to an institutional centre that provides consistency within a territorial society (nation), and in the Western world turns into a dynamic core of (inter)relations among relatives, or a domestic partnership of cohabitation, as we advance into the 20th century. Further evidence on the shifting of metaphors comes from newspapers and other media structures. Cristina Odone (Daily Telegraph, January 2012), for example, speaks of raven's mothers (Rabenmütter) having "flown the nest" to seek professional success or just simply money to support their families. Andrea Whatcott (2011) speaks of the contemporary family as "a country with no clear boundaries," where the private/public working-space is "blurred" by the growing use of digital technology and tele-work options. Nevertheless, all these descriptions fail to include an important aspect of family-bonds: "love." In "3 Steps to a Closer Stronger Family" (2012), Marie Hartwell-Walker introduces the concept of "familyness" (Time + Talk + Teamwork), a network of intersubjective relations that operates on three basic components: shared attention, intention and emotion. This intersubjective understanding implies more than merely empathic responses or conscious consensual validation via semiotics exchanges (eye-contact, gestures, verbal language).
Here intersubjectivity becomes an ontological loci where the interiorities of participants are not just interdependently shaped by their interaction, but a co-creative, co-dependent, interpenetrating organic mutuality. Furthermore, neuroscientific evidence shows that the sharing of experiences is shaped by early family exchanges that take place primary at the level of affect and conative (action-oriented) engagements before moving on to higher levels of cognition where conscious understanding might take the place of trust. Children learn from watching their mothers and fathers perform certain actions and their results. This learning involves more than a functional understanding of actions. It implies that children acquire knowledge about the beliefs and desires that move their parents to act in a certain way, and learn to contextualize these beliefs and desires in their own experiences. In other words, they perceive their parents actions (attention), they learn about intentional actions, and use all this knowledge because of trust. Another way to look at empathic understanding is to contemplate it as an attempt to share some common ground. Since experience is always internal or intrinsic to the subject, that is, it is constitutive of the subject, it might be said that in trusting, the narcissistic ego experiences a moment of dispossession rather than appropriation of experiences (see López-Varela, 2010) .
The family situation is fundamental for the development of intersubjectivity because of the triangular situation it presents. In mother-child bonding, each subject correlates their own reactions to external phenomena by means of other's reactions. But communication is not really implemented until the two agents make use of a triangular situation to form judgments about the world by means of language. The ability to describe the world at an objective level depends on the ability to communicate perceptions to a third person. In psychology Lacan's theory related this important development to the ability to name the father. To illustrate this, let us take the idea of "love."
Being an abstract concept, "love" needs to be communicated by means of metaphoric structures. Children learn about love by noticing certain types of behavior between their parents. Although "love" is a private, subjective experience, as a mental intentional state, it can be in-ferred from behavioral expressions. However, in order to internalize the experience, children need to develop similar feelings. Research on autism, for instance, has shown that it might be a case of failure to integrate 1st and 3rd person information in the understanding of self and other, thus making impossible shared representations. This failure will have a neurological basis in the lack of certain mirror-neuron structures, since it seems that neurons fire equivalently for all intentional relations of self and other, whether object-directed actions, emotions or mental activities.
